



ACCESS DENIED; TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH TO SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR FORMALLY EXCLUDED MIGRANTS





This article discusses some recent trends in the area of immigration and social security. Access to social security is rendered more difficult, particularly for irregular immigrants, while the scope of application of the social security system is more closely linked to the national border (retrenchment to the national borders). It is argued that these trends can be attributed to restrictive immigration policies and the implicit rejection of transnational citizenship. These factors also appear to affect the strength of the transnational informal social security networks that migrant groups are members of. The article calls for an alternative strategy for the social protection of irregular migrants based upon respect for human rights, extra-territorial responsibility of migrants and more socially inspired return policies





This article reports on some of the outcomes of research projects carried out within the framework of the Cross-Border Welfare research programme. This privately funded, five-year programme ran between 2006 and 2012 and accommodated four PhD posts as well as a number of smaller, auxiliary research initiatives (see, for a summary of the outcomes of the separate research projects, Vonk 2012​[1]​). The programme focused on the social security position of non-EU migrants and its central aim was to gain a better understanding of how law and policies in the area of immigration, social security and civic integration interact.

There is one common theme that can be observed in all the studies that were carried out. This is the mechanisms by which migrants are included or excluded from social security. In other words, how is the line between inclusion and exclusion defined for different groups of migrants; how has this line changed over time and why; and how do the exclusions manifest themselves in the concrete legal position of migrants? This article elaborates on this theme.

Mapping the line between inclusion and exclusion is not the final objective of the present exercise. We want to take the argument a little further by looking at the consequences of excluding migrants from social security. The central question addressed is a paradoxical one. Knowing that the exclusion of certain immigrants from social security is legitimate from the point of view of national policies and interests, or even from the point of view of the logics of the social security system itself, what alternative strategies can be developed in order to address the social protection of immigrants without undermining these policies, interests and logics? 

The purpose of this article is to develop alternative approaches to social protection for migrants who are excluded from the regular social security system − in particular, irregular migrants. A number of options for the social protection of migrants will be explored, ranging from codifying minimum care obligations arising from human rights standards to providing temporary income support and credits to migrants who voluntarily return to their countries of origin. The willingness to address such alternative approaches is what we refer to as ‘a new approach to social protection for formally excluded migrants’. 

The article is structured in a ‘dialectical fashion’, which is a way of saying that it falls into three sections that can be presented as a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. Section 2 contains the thesis dealing with the exclusion of migrants from the formal, public social security schemes. It discusses how the new dynamics result in a deterioration of the legal position of migrants in social security, particularly in terms of the exclusion of certain groups and migrants (in particular, irregular immigrants) and retrenchment of the national border system (which affects, inter alia, the exportability of benefits). Section 2 finishes by raising the question of how international human rights law responds to these trends.

Section 3 is presented as the antithesis. It addresses the position of immigrants in relation to social security provided outside the formal state framework, in informal social security. As will be shown, these alternative forms of social security challenge the formal concept of social security. They do so because, in the first place, they do not form part of the public arrangements in the host country but are based on civil society initiatives; and, secondly, because they are not locked up in the nation state, but are transnational by nature. On the basis of a number of case studies in the Netherlands, we demonstrate that the two trends of exclusion and retrenchment can equally affect informal social security arrangements for migrants.

Section 4 connects the two spheres of formal and informal social security for migrant workers and constitutes the synthesis. It is entitled ‘towards a new approach to social protection for formally excluded migrants’. The question dealt with is ‘what are the responsibilities of the (international) government towards excluded migrants?’ This section offers a list of alternative forms of protection that are not necessarily at odds with formal government policies, such as the provision of minimum care for vulnerable persons, respecting private and informal social security arrangements, giving extra-territorial protection to immigrants and emigrants and providing financial support to voluntary returnees. Because such forms of protection are not all considered to be part of the regular social security system, in section 4 we employ the wider term ‘social protection’.

When commenting upon the position of migrants in social security, we refer to international law, to European Union law and to the situation in different countries. One country in particular serves as a fixed point of reference, i.e. the Netherlands. As such, this is not a bad choice, as the Netherlands has made a series of quite well articulated choices in formulating the legal position of migrants in social security. In this way, the Netherlands has created an interesting laboratory for testing new policies. However it means that the reader must be careful not to extrapolate the Dutch experience too easily to other countries. Very often this is not possible (see, for example, comparative analysis carried out by Kapuy (2011) and the Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2012), which has pointed out that Dutch exclusion practices vis a vis irregular immigrants are far stricter than those of other European countries).

In this article considerable attention is focused on the position of irregular immigrants. Defining the irregular immigrant is an art in itself (Guild 2004: 3-17). Between a legal ‘white’ status and an irregular ‘black’ status there are many shades of grey. This study employs a deliberately broad definition of ‘all non-citizen migrants staying in a county without the required authorisation’. This definition includes migrants who have not been given a positive decision as to their right to stay or reside by the authorities of the host state. This means that not only groups without any status (e.g. unreported immigrants) and those who must leave immediately (e.g. on grounds of an expulsion order) but also other categories such as immigrants who are awaiting the outcome of an application for a residence permit and ‘overstayers’ are also included in the definition. Asylum seekers, defined as persons applying for protection in another country until a final decision on that application has been made, are, however, treated as a separate category. This is done by reason of the fact that in view of the principle of non-refoulement, states have a stronger responsibility towards the social protection of asylum seekers.

2.	THE EXCLUSION OF MIGRANTS FROM THE FORMAL SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 

2.1.	Some general starting points





European social insurance schemes generally accept immigrants within the scope of protection. This is most clearly visible in work-based insurance schemes, which include workers on the basis of their employment status, but it is also reflected in residence-based insurance schemes (Kapuy 2011: 641-650). For example, the Dutch general social insurance schemes do not impose any obstacles to the participation of migrants as long as they are considered to be resident (as from 1998, legally resident) in the Netherlands (Kapuy 2011: 471-279). This observation actually coincides with the situation in other countries which have residence-based schemes, such as the Nordic countries, although this does not rule out the possibility that some of these countries apply minimum periods of insurance.​[3]​ 

The social insurance position of migrants is further improved by the network of social security treaties extending throughout the entire world. The treaties provide, inter alia, for equality of treatment on grounds of nationality, the exportability of pension rights, and the accumulation of insurance periods that have been built up in different countries. Within the EU, the function of the bilateral and subsequent multilateral agreements have been taken over by a single Regulation, presently known as Regulation 883/2004 coordinating the social security systems of all the 27 Member States.​[4]​ The application of this regulation is extended to all legally residing non-EU citizens who move between the Member States.​[5]​ 

2.1.2.	Social and medical assistance

Access to social assistance for migrants has always been more problematic than access to social insurance. The likely explanation is that most social assistance schemes are rooted in a unilateral charitable obligation, rather than in a reciprocal insurance relationship between the insured person and the social insurance institution. Although, partly influenced by European human rights law, nationality is no longer the exclusive entitlement condition, entitlement to social assistance often depends on the legality of residence, while in turn the legality of residence may depend upon the foreigner claiming social assistance. Only for those with permanent residence status may such conditions be alleviated. Furthermore, exceptions may be made for irregular migrants who are in an emergency situation, in which it is possible for the local authorities to offer relief on a temporary basis.​[6]​ Such exceptions follow from the nature of social assistance as a final safety net within the social security system.

Assistance for migrants is protected by the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance of 1953. This Convention allows for payment of social and medical assistance to foreigners until the point at which the legality of their residence is terminated. In fact, nowadays, all major international migration Conventions contain a provision on equality of treatment for migrants in the field of social security and on social assistance for migrant workers: the UN Conventions on refugees and stateless persons, ILO Convention No. 97 on Migration for Employment, the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, and, of course, the modern 1990 International Convention on the Protection of Rights of all Migrant Workers. These Conventions may be very relevant as their personal and material scope of application is wider than the traditional social security coordination instruments, which exclude social assistance, housing and other types of welfare services for those who are not economically active. As a matter of fact, exactly the same situation has always applied in the European Union, where migration Regulation no. 1612/68 − in particular Art. 7(2) Regulation no. 1612/68,​[7]​ prescribing equality of treatment in the area of social and fiscal advantages − played a major role in relation to social security Regulation no. 1408/71 (which excluded social assistance from its material scope of application).​[8]​ Nowadays, the importance of Art. 7(2) Regulation no. 1612/68 for case law has been taken over by the very notion of European citizenship itself (Hailbronner 2006: 65-78; Van der Mei 2002: 93-107).​[9]​

2.2.	New dynamics of in- and exclusion of migrants in social security 

The line between the inclusion and the exclusion of migrants in social security is not static, but changes over time. In order to understand these changes we must look at underlying forces that affect the social security position of migrants. We look below at two trends: The first is the tendency of governments to allow arguments on immigration policy to enter the domain of social security; the second is the increasing rejection of transnational alignment of migrants. 

2.2.1.	The prevalence of immigration law over social security: exclusion of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers

The preoccupation of states with the enforcement of immigration rules is also evident in social security. Increasingly, entitlement to benefits is linked to immigration status. In law, the preference of migration law over social security status is apparent in the legal residence test. This test is widespread both in national law and in international law. In the Netherlands, it was introduced with the so-called ‘Linkage Act’ of 1998. Irregular immigrants are completely excluded from all public services, including social insurance benefits, but excluding legal aid, education for those under the age of 16 and medical care in emergency situations (Minderhoud 2000). The legal residence test was also introduced in the UK for most work not related social security benefits in 2004 as part of a redefinition of the qualifying condition of ‘habitually resident’, and in France as a general condition of affiliation to the system. Attempts are also being made to introduce the test outside Europe, most notably in the US, where, since the second half of the last decade, the previous Bush and present Obama administrations have been struggling to introduce the No Social Security for Illegal Immigrants Act,​[10]​ without success to date. There are also countries that show no particular interest in the issue and allow the test to play its ‘original role’ in social assistance only. In such countries contributory insurance schemes do not necessarily exclude foreigners on grounds of their immigration status, as employers are normally under an obligation to make social insurance contributions, even if they employ irregular workers. This is also the case for benefits in respect of industrial accidents and occupational diseases, whose origins derive from the civil law liability of the employer, but less so for unemployment insurance benefits that are based on an obligation to join the labour market, which is − at least officially − not possible in relation to illegal residence (Kapuy 2012: 650-651). 

The legal residence test is targeted at irregular immigrants. Indeed, they enjoy no equality of treatment whatsoever, and very often have to cope with hardly any support. With regard to social assistance, some countries only grant minimal aid, in kind and/or on a discretionary basis. Medical care is often limited to emergency situations only. Other countries deny any form of emergency relief under their social assistance schemes. In practice, this state of affairs often means that local communities or charitable institutions assume the role of providing some form of care and protection (Cholewinski 2005; European Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011; Pieters and Schoukens 2004). 

Asylum seekers are also excluded from regular support schemes on grounds of their weak immigration status (Bank 2000: 148-169; Slingenberg 2012). Initially, in many countries, asylum seekers were covered by national social assistance schemes, but gradually separate schemes were set up, providing alternative and often very minimal forms of assistance, e.g. benefits in kind, vouchers, pocket money, or in some cases, no assistance at all. Exclusion from social security is often coupled with all sorts of other restrictions on the choice of housing and work. Such measures are often viewed as making the country less attractive for asylum seekers wishing to apply for refugee status. 

A halt has been placed on the deterioration of social conditions in Europe by Directive 2003/9/EC on the reception of asylum seekers. Interestingly, this Directive is not devoid of the pressures exercised by immigration policies. According to the preamble, it serves a double function, not only to secure a decent standard of living for asylum seekers, but also to ensure comparable living conditions in the Member States in order to avoid secondary movements influenced by varying reception conditions. It has been suggested that the latter motive has been the decisive one for the adoption of the Directive (Slingenberg 2012: paragraph 3.3).

The legal residence test, which characterises access to social protection for non-citizen migrants in national law, is fully reflected in the protective clauses on equal treatment in international migration law. Thus, looking at the instruments referred to in Section 5.1, the following picture emerges. The European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance only provides equality of treatment to immigrants who are ‘lawfully present’. Articles 20 to 24 of the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, which deal with rights to welfare, are restricted to those who are ‘lawfully staying’. Art. 1 of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers restricts the application of the Convention to ‘nationals of a Contracting Party who have been authorised to reside in the territory of another Contracting Party in order to take up paid employment’. Something similar applies for ILO Convention No. 97 (Art. 11). Only the 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of Rights of all Migrant Workers Rights seems to take a more benign stance in respect of irregular immigrants, at least providing a right to medical assistance in emergency situations (Art. 28), but this Convention has still not been ratified by a single Western or Arab state. 

The legitimising effect of the law with regard to the exclusion of asylum seekers and irregular immigrants is further enhanced by the efforts of European governments to actively promote the adoption of restrictive clauses in international legal instruments that are relevant for the social security protection of migrants. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement EC-Morocco, signed in 1996, restricts equality of treatment in the field of social security to persons working and residing legally in the territories of the host countries.​[11]​ A similar restriction has been formulated in the recently adopted Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union in Art. 34(2), which deals with the right to social security for migrants who move within the territory of Europe.​[12]​ 

2.2.2.	Rejection of transnational alignment: retrenchment of the national border.

Many states are in the process of redefining their political conception of citizenship. This change is not only suspicious of multiculturalism (the immigrant must accept the national way of life as his own), but is also opposed to transnational alignments (the immigrant is supposed to develop unique ties with a country) (Vermeulen 2010). This is also leading to restrictions in social security rights for migrants, particularly where these rights can be invoked in an extra- territorial context. The Netherlands is a clear example of this. Here, the social security system always used to have an open relationship with the outside world: long-term benefits were freely exportable throughout the globe, recipients of benefits abroad enjoyed continued affiliation; the general social insurance schemes based upon residence allowed for unrestricted voluntary insurance for people moving abroad; child benefits were payable for children residing outside the country; and the Netherlands adhered to a wide network of often rather generous bilateral social security agreements. However, in the second half of the 1990s, a number of legislative changes were introduced that resulted in an abrupt end to these open characteristics: continued insurance for pensioners abroad was abolished and a total ban on the export of benefits was introduced (except for international obligations). Furthermore, voluntary participation in general insurance schemes was limited to a period of ten years. These measures were taken independently from each other for various reasons. Taken together, however, their effects point in the same direction, namely to a retrenchment of the system to national borders, particularly affecting those with transnational ties (Vonk 2001).

Interestingly, the new entrenchment policies do not work in the same way for all immigrants. From the point of view of national law, no distinctions are made between the national origins of the immigrants involved, but such distinctions arise as a curious by-product of the interaction of national law and international law. If the quality of national treatment is favourable, i.e. when national social security law allows equal access to benefits schemes and refrains from territorial restrictions, the effects of the absence of international social security treaties for migrants may be limited. But when the quality of national conditions for migrants is poor, then the contrast between those who are protected by international agreements and those who are not becomes clearer. While the new legislation is often partly, or even fully, mitigated by EU law and the provisions of bilateral social security agreements, it applies in full force to migrants from countries with which the Netherlands has not entered into any social security obligations. Intentionally or otherwise, these happen to be the developing countries which exert the immigration pressures that the Dutch government is endeavouring to curb. Actually, with regard to the export ban introduced in 2000, the legislation anticipated the interplay between national law and international obligations. The idea was not to restrict the payment of benefits abroad as such, but to make the export of benefits dependent on the existence of international obligations. It was thought that, in this way, other states would be more prepared to participate in verification measures imposed by Dutch social security institutions. 

In the meantime, successive Dutch governments have continued to develop the retrenchment agenda. Further export prohibitions were introduced in 2012, while the administration tried to reverse the notion of ‘dual residence’ accepted by the courts for the purposes of affiliation to the general insurance scheme (acceptance of Dutch residence for migrants who also have strong links with the country of origin).​[13]​ These measures are testimonies of the unwillingness to give social security support to persons who maintain connections with other countries.

2.3.	Exclusion, retrenchment and basic human rights

To what extent do international human rights create barriers to the trends discussed above? This question is particularly pressing in view of the exclusion of irregular immigrants from the system. To what extent do human rights affect the exclusion of irregular immigrants from social protection? The answer to this question is a contentious one. There are some − for example, Cholewinsky (2005: 46) and Mikkola (2008: 25-59) − who argue that international human rights entail an obligation on the state to provide social assistance to enable a migrant worker to live in dignity. Others maintain that such a general obligation under international law does not exist (Pieters and Schoukens 2004), or that it is at least problematic (Noll 2010). For example, in his recent extensive research on the position of irregular migrant workers in social security, Kapuy (2011) came to the conclusion that explicitly binding international legal obligations to protect irregular immigrants are few and far between, and do not so much stem from international human rights, but rather from very specific EU instruments, such as the EC Return Directive 2008/115 and the EC Directive 2004/81 on victims of human trafficking, which contain obligations to provide emergency medical treatment. The authors do not rejoice at this conclusion, we simply deduce it from the state of positive law.

Meanwhile, we should like to add that, while the case at the core of the exclusion of irregular immigrants from social protection is untouched by international human rights, there are an increasing number of cases nibbling away at the fringes of this core, sometimes eating out quite large chunks. 

In the first place, with regard to asylum seekers, it is important to recognize that protective standards not only ensue from EC Directive 2003/9/EC. On 21 January 2011, in the case of MSS v. Belgium and Greece, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) determined that the treatment of asylum seekers in Greece − or rather the lack of any treatment − constituted a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).​[14]​ In particular, it follows from this case that, if a state does not intentionally provide asylum seekers with the benefits laid down in the EC directive or in their domestic law, it can be held responsible for asylum seekers’ living conditions. Similarly, six years earlier in 2005, in the Limbuela case, the British House of Lords came to the conclusion that it is illegal for the state to refuse any assistance and housing to asylum seekers, while at the same time prohibiting them from working. ​[15]​ The very fact that the host state has some responsibility for the maintenance of asylum seekers, apparently, is enough to justify a minimum care obligation.

Secondly, when it comes to the levels of support that should be provided to asylum seekers, the ECtHR case law on detention conditions may be relevant. This follows from the general supposition of the Court that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position, and that the authorities are therefore under a duty to protect them. Asylum seekers are − increasingly − placed in the hands of the state and subjected to strict controls over their place of residence. Slingenberg (2012: paragraph 12.2.4) therefore argues that, in such cases, the ECtHR case law on detention conditions should, analogously, apply to them. Case law with regard to the treatment of detainees is strict. Relevant factors that should be taken into account are the existence of sufficient and adequate living space; sanitary products (even toilet paper); adequate food; clean bed linen; medical care and necessary medical aids, such as glasses or dentures; the presence of radio and TV; and the temperature of the cell.

Thirdly, a minimum care obligation seems to have developed for vulnerable categories of persons who are illegally residing in their host countries, notably children of irregular immigrants and pregnant women. Thus, for example, in a complaint lodged last year by Defence for Children, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) ruled that it was contrary to the European Charter for the Netherlands to refuse support to young children whose parents reside illegally in the country.​[16]​ Part of the reasoning of the Committee was based upon the United National Convention on the Rights of the Child. It has been argued that the decision of the European Committee of Social Rights was not so important, because it was not legally binding. However, the same no longer holds true for subsequent Netherlands court cases, directly or indirectly influenced by the decision of the European Committee of Social Rights. For example, in 2010, the Court of Appeal in the Hague pronounced that the state commits a tort when it sends an Angolan mother with four very young children out onto the streets without any support, simply because it is inhumane to do so. This decision, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2012, referred to a number of international human rights obligations, including the European Social Charter.​[17]​ Case law in Belgium − and who knows how many other countries − also recognises a duty to provide social assistance in respect of children of illegal parents, albeit at a reduced rate (Kapuy 2012) 

Finally, national and international case law allows for exceptions to the exclusion of irregular immigrants in cases of medical emergencies. There are an increasing number of court decisions that express a duty to provide some form of relief in such situations. Very often such decisions are human rights inspired and made on the basis of the merits of the case (for an overview of the situation in Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, see Kapuy (2011); for the case law of the ECtHR, see Slingenberg (2012: paragraph 12.3.2); and for a general description, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2011)).

These four trends illustrate the growing impatience of human rights authorities with rigid exclusions of rights for irregular immigrants. In our view, the underlying current on which the case law is based steers towards some form of recognition of minimum social care responsibility for irregular immigrants rather than away from it. But one must be careful not to state such trends in over-optimistic terms. Court interventions deal with individual cases of extreme exposure, vulnerability and poverty. The same applies to questions dealing with retrenchment of social security. While it true that international human rights take some conceptual steps towards accepting extra-territorial responsibility for the protection of migrants (Hesselman 2013), this is still a far cry from courts putting up barriers to measures limiting the exportability of social security benefits. Indeed, the Carson case of the ECtHR of 16 March 2010, which challenged the limited exportability of UK benefits, has shown that states enjoy considerable freedom in this area.​[18]​ The overall picture is, then, that the trends towards exclusion and retrenchment have been allowed to continue without too much opposition from international law. Only in emergency cases or in relation to vulnerable groups have international human rights put up some minimal obstacles. 





Whereas the previous section focused mainly on formal state regulated institutions that provide social security within the migrant’s country of residence, this section addresses the existential needs of migrants, the interactions they engage in to meet those needs and the web of social relations and normative structures that form those interactions. This approach is often referred to in literature as an ‘informal’ approach to social security. The term ‘informal’ is somewhat misleading, since it implies a dichotomous relationship to the institutional approach described above, which would thus be referred to as ‘formal’. However, formal social security institutions are not necessarily absent from this so-called ‘informal’ analysis, nor do the social phenomena that it describes stand separate from state institutions. On the contrary, state institutions may well be involved (Benda-Beckmann 1994: 7-31). Nonetheless, since the term ‘informal social security’ is now an accepted one, we too shall adhere to it.

The fact that migrants are excluded from formal social security does not mean they do not participate in other reciprocal relationships of mutual support within that same society. Below, we will start by briefly discussing three examples of how migrants mobilise social relationships, in a transnational context, to meet their needs for social security. In this description we will make use of an empirical study that was conducted in 2008 and 2009 among migrant domestic workers residing in the Netherlands and some of their family members residing in Ghana, in the first case; and the Philippines, in the second.​[19]​ As will become apparent, the same factors that negatively impact upon the position of migrants in formal social security also affect the quality of such informal relations.

3.2.	Informal social security arrangements: three examples

The three aspects of informal social security that we report on relate to cover of health risks and other emergencies affecting migrants’ kin in their countries of origin; transnational arrangements for housing and (paid) care; and migrants’ financial provisions for retirement in their countries of origin. The first example explores the (possible) cumulative gains that can accrue from including transnational oriented migrants in formal social security schemes. The second explores how regimes of care in migrants’ countries of origin and residence have become entwined with each other and the normative issues that this raises. The third explores how the convergence of restrictive migration policies with other regimes of exclusion can undermine transnational strategies to secure social protection.

3.2.1.	Transnational effects of including migrants in national health care benefits 

Until recently, hospitals in Ghana worked on a ‘cash and carry’ basis: Patients who were unable to pay, did not receive any care. In the event of an emergency, the pressure on migrants living abroad to provide their family members in Ghana with the necessary funds to access health care could be considerable (Smith 2007: 181). Starting in the early 1990s, communal health insurance schemes started to develop in various districts in Ghana. In 2007, these local initiatives were taken over by the Ghanaian government and successfully applied nationwide.​[20]​ 

While at first sight these developments are only relevant to the social protection of persons in Ghana, and not in the Netherlands, they nevertheless have had important implications for the material security of Ghanaian migrants residing in the Netherlands. These migrants are now better able to manage their savings for their own present and future needs. They no longer have to cover all the medical costs of chronically ill relatives, or plunder their savings and/or borrow funds at short notice to cover the costs of a medical emergency in Ghana.

The successful implementation of a national health insurance scheme in Ghana was not self-evident. Anthropologists have often made the point that paying insurance contributions is not something people in rural African societies are inclined to do (see, for example, Kabki 2007: 22; Platteau 1991: 112-170). However, in his doctoral research, the human geographer, Lothar Smith, has reported on extended families that have set up emergency funds, primarily intended to cover funeral costs in Ghana. What is interesting to us is the initiating role that migrant family members living in more affluent nations have played in setting up these schemes.

Our data indicates, moreover, that Ghanaians are not averse to paying for health insurance once they have settled in the Netherlands − on the contrary, interviewees who were documented and statutorily obliged to pay never complained about that fact, and one woman who was undocumented, and therefore excluded from regular insurance, had taken out tourist insurance so that she would at least be covered in the event of an accident. Smith even reports on a man who, after returning to Ghana, continued to pay premiums in the Netherlands to cover his wife and child who had stayed behind in the Netherlands, and for himself as well (Smith 2007: 181). These examples show how the social protection offered to migrants who have been included in the institutional arrangements offered by the Dutch state can reach beyond the borders of the Dutch nation. The indirect positive effects on the social protection of dependent kin in migrants’ countries of origin can in turn help to augment the social protection of migrants in the Netherlands. Such forms of cumulative gain are not normally included in the calculations of the costs and benefits of specific social protection regimes made from an institutional perspective.

3.2.2.	Transnational arrangements for housing and (paid) care 

We now consider how social protection regimes in migrants’ countries of origin and in their countries of residence can interact, and look at the implications of such interaction for migrants who have been excluded from institutional forms of social protection in their countries of residence. The focus here is specifically on migrant domestic workers and their engagement in the construction of homes in their countries of origin, in the maintenance of homes in their countries of residence, and in care arrangements in both localities 

Paradoxically, measures designed to exclude irregular migrants from various facets of Dutch society have, in fact, driven many of them into the heartland of that society − its citizens’ private homes. As restrictions on the employment of irregular migrants in other sectors came to be more vigorously enforced, more and more irregular migrants – both men and women – have responded to the increasing demand for domestic services, where such controls are rare due to privacy considerations. In this context of intimacy, some may succeed in deriving a degree of social protection from their relationship with their employers. Our data shows how some Filipino domestic workers in particular, who counted a relatively large number of professionals among their employers, were able to access medical care via their employers’ networks. All domestic workers, moreover, reported relying on their employers’ networks for finding new opportunities for employment. 

As Dutch immigration policies become more restrictive, irregular domestic workers may come to rely on their employers for shelter as well. One woman reported that she knew of several Filipinas who worked as live-in domestics in an affluent suburb outside Amsterdam, where the houses are roomier than in the city centres, and are more conducive to such arrangements. Formerly, according to her, these women would have been eager to leave such a live-in arrangement because of the limits to privacy and personal freedom that it implies. They would have moved into the city, found a place to stay, and looked for work on a live-out basis. The women she spoke to more recently, however, seemed reluctant to leave their employers’ homes because of the increased risks involved in illegally sub-letting an apartment in the city – one of the few housing arrangements available to irregular migrants. In an effort to gain more control over the low-cost housing sector, Dutch housing associations had become more active in tracking down people who sublet illegally. Rumours circulated of Filipinos being caught during such controls, handed over to the immigration authorities and deported. In the context of increased controls, providing domestic services on a live-in basis became more attractive despite the limits to privacy and the increased dependency on the employer that it entailed.

In migrants’ countries of origin, too, issues of shelter and care are often intertwined. Lothar Smith, in his PhD dissertation already quoted above, reports how Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands have constructed dwellings in their hometowns to express their success as migrants and their commitment to the extended family there, but also to secure shelter for themselves in their own old age, in a place where they expect to be looked after and kept company by their kin (Mazzali et al. 2006; 42-43; Smith 2007; 22-23;). Our own data confirm Smith’s findings in the Ghanaian case (Van Walsum 2011). Interestingly, the link that he describes between investment in real estate and in future care also emerges in our data concerning Filipino migrants.

3.2.3.	Financial provisions for retirement in the country of origin.	

As the populations of the more affluent nations age, their societies are becoming more dependent on care and household services being provided by young adult migrants from Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, South America and South East Asia. To the extent that these migrants are rendered unable − through live-in work arrangements and/or restrictive migration policies − to engage in close physical contact with their kin, establishing and/or maintaining a family remains problematic for them. Making suitable arrangements for support, care and company for these and other migrant workers in their old age is arguably one of the most urgent challenges at present in the sphere of social protection and migration.

For migrants who are excluded from formal arrangements of social protection in their country of residence, and who are unable or unwilling to rely solely on the future support of family in their country of origin, commercial insurance or other financial products can provide a solution. Under the auspices of the Filipino Ministry of Labour, and of organisations such as UNICEF and Oxfam-Novib, some Filipino NGOs have set up projects that link (undocumented) migrants in Europe to rural financial institutions in the Philippines. These institutions finance development projects that are screened for their business potential by micro finance experts, and are covered, to a degree at least, by insurance funded by COS, a Dutch NGO active in the field of third world development (Anonuevo et al. 2008). 

Although they are not formally involved in this project, interviews with Filipino state actors (including the Filipino consulate in the Netherlands) revealed that they follow it with interest and sympathy through informal networks. The financial position of returning migrants is a topic of concern for the Filipino Ministry of Labour, the worry being that some may return worse off than they left. While regular migrants can be approached through consular officials abroad, and encouraged to continue contributing to national social insurance schemes, irregular migrants are harder to track down and include in such schemes. Transnationally co-ordinated investment projects, like the one described here, form an alternative strategy for ensuring some financial security for these migrants upon their return to the Philippines.

Irregular migrants taking part in this project are, however, hampered in their participation by the fact that, as irregular migrants, they are excluded from regular banking by Dutch law. In fact, in order to send their money abroad, they either have to access the bank account of a legally resident countryman or woman, join a collective bank account run by a legally resident member of some form of association, or rely on family in the Philippines to transfer remittances to their account there. Hence, their ability to secure funds for their personal future needs remains dependent on the loyalty and honesty of their kin and/or members of other social networks. State controls of transnational banking, which are closely linked with state controls of migration, thus exacerbate the exclusion of irregular migrants from state regulated forms of social protection, by complicating the realisation of alternative arrangements through transnational financial transactions.

3.4.	Concluding observation: exclusion and retrenchment in informal social security

In this section we shift the perspective from that of the state as provider of social security to migrants themselves and their involvement in a broad array of social relationships in which they both rely on others to provide them with care, support or shelter – now or in the future – and are instrumental in providing for the basic needs of others, both in their country of origin and in their country of residence. The involvement of irregular migrants in the provision of services that formerly would have formed part of informal social security arrangements provided by citizens among themselves reveals the limits of a nationalist framework. This perspective on social protection also enabled us to demonstrate how, besides state regulated provisions, social networks grounded in kinship or faith, a shared place of origin, or common locality of current residence, employment relationships and financial products can all play a role in securing basic needs. Formal social security schemes form part of the story, but exclusion from these need not mean exclusion from all other sources of social security. 

At the same time, however, formal social security does not stand in complete isolation from informally regulated arrangements. In Section 2 we discussed the effect on social security of the prevalence of immigration policy and the rejection of transitional alignment. Interestingly, similar effects are visible in informal social security arrangements (Guild 2009). The exclusion of irregular migrants from regular banking transactions is one example. The limits to freedom of movement that result from stricter visa requirements are another. In the Netherlands, most migrants from outside of the EU, North America, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and some Latin American countries are subject to visa requirements. Should they return to their country of origin after a period of irregular stay, they will have to wait at least five years before being able to acquire a new visa. Once present in the Netherlands, they will therefore not be readily inclined to leave. As discussed above, this has repercussions for their ability to maintain their transnational social ties. The criminalisation of those who provide irregular migrants with shelter or employment (Guild 2009) is also evident. While generally justified as measures designed to combat exploitation and abuse, the experiences of the migrant domestic workers described above suggest that, in practice, such measures may very well facilitate abusive relationships, rather than discourage them. 

4. 	TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH TO SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR FORMALLY EXCLUDED MIGRANTS

4.1.	The need for an alternative approach

From the point of view of state policy, the new dynamics of exclusion and retrenchment are, to a large extent, understandable. Governments wanting to improve the effectiveness of immigration policies and encourage the integration of newcomers would gain nothing by giving more rights to irregular immigrants and offering migrants a favourable basket of extra-territorial benefit rights, allowing them to entertain relations with other states. 

Yet, it would be short-sighted only to look at the legitimacy of the exclusion arguments and to turn a blind eye to the negative consequences of present day policies. Whatever the legislature does to outlaw irregular immigration, the irregular immigrant will not cease to exist. In fact, the estimated number of irregular immigrants in Europe ranges between 1.8 and 3.3 million persons; in the Netherlands the group is estimated to be between 60,000 and 130,000 (Kovacheva and Vogel 2009). Due to their lack of legal status, both in terms of immigration law and of social security, irregular immigrants are highly vulnerable to economic exploitation and degrading treatment. Furthermore, the absence of any protection for irregular immigrants can lead to tension between local and central government, the former having to bear the brunt of the formal exclusion from social security established by the latter. Furthermore, the situation with regard to the exclusion of irregular immigrants is often not as clear-cut as it seems, as public authorities tend to support, or even finance, non-governmental organisations in their efforts to help irregular immigrants, which leads to unclear and seemingly contradictory government practices. Finally, as courts are frequently called upon to smooth over the sharp edges of exclusionary measures in individual cases, the harsh policies forge a wedge between legislature and the judiciary, which results in uncertain legal positions and tensions in the legal order.

The more uncompromising the policies of exclusion are, the more such disadvantages come to the fore. The Dutch policy reflexes illustrate this: when it emerges that new legislative measures and stricter forms of control are not fully effective in stamping out irregular immigration, more stringent measures are introduced. In this way the policies develop a distinctly repressive flavour. This is reflected in the rigidity of prohibitions (e.g. no social assistance, not even in emergencies), in the imposition of harsh sanctions on immigrants who fail to meet their obligations (e.g. no social assistance if a migrant fails to acquire the right civic integration papers on time), in the incapacity to take into account individual circumstances (e.g. no entitlement to residence based social insurance, even if a irregular immigrant is fully integrated), and more broadly speaking, in the criminalisation of immigrants. There is plenty of evidence that this is a Europe-wide trend (Guild 2009). 

The repressiveness of the recent policy trend creates unwanted side effects: marginalisation, exposure of individual human beings, social tensions, human trafficking, prostitution and underground activities. Combating irregular migration is thus like fighting Hydra − each time you chop off its head, two new ones reappear. 

In this final section we raise the question of whether there are any alternative solutions for the social protection of excluded immigrants that would yield better results and which are not necessarily contrary to the interests of the states concerned. Is it possible for the repressive policy cycle to adopt a more positive approach? Below we have developed some proposals. They are based upon three building blocks: 
	respecting basic human rights (4.2);
	extra territorial responsibilities for  migrants (4.3); and 
	emigrants and international co-operation in the event of return (4.4).

4.2	Respecting basic human rights

In Section 2.3 we noted that human rights case law tends to flow towards some form of recognition of responsibility for minimum social care for irregular immigrants rather than away from it. This minimum care responsibility, however, does not express itself in some general right to social and medical assistance, but merely in the recognition of a duty to provide medical support, shelter, or aid in individual situations of exceptional vulnerability and need, for example when young children are involved, or in cases of medical emergency. In our eyes, states should − at least − accept such a duty based upon their discretionary powers.

Is it feasible that the international community will take on board the growing body of national and international human rights case law dealing with vulnerable irregular immigrants and accept such a duty in an international legal document? States would probably hate this. Yet we would challenge any person to refute that, under the present law of all the European states, this duty already exists, if not on the basis of primary legislation, then at least on the basis of local laws and in case law. More research is needed to provide evidence for this, but we are convinced that, once such research has been conducted, governments will be provided with ample evidence that an international minimum care obligation is nothing more than a reflection of their national state practice (this suggestion is supported by the recent research carried out by the Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2012) on care and services for irregular immigrants in Belgium, Denmark, France and the Netherlands). A 2011 report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights also revealed that all the ten countries studies recognised a duty to provide health care in emergency situations or to specific groups such as children, while four of the ten countries went further than that, and did not impose explicit legal residence conditions (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011a).

Respecting human rights is not only an issue of providing support in cases of extreme vulnerability, it is also a question of respecting informal social security. We have seen how government policies negatively impact on forms of protection outside the social security system. For example, blocking bank facilities and providing care, shelter or housing to irregular immigrants is increasingly branded as a criminal offence. In our view, such a crossover of government policies in the private domain conflicts with essential freedom rights which exist in our societies. For this reason, we assume that the logics of exclusion may not stretch beyond the public social security system. Private and charitable initiatives must be respected and even protected. This imposes limits to the exclusionary measures that can be taken in the name of migration control. Irregular migrants must be secured access to general facilities needed to effectuate their self-help, in particular the banking system, communication services and public transport.

While the argument of non-interference is easy to accept in relation to the family networks of irregular immigrants or faith associations, it is perhaps less so vis-à-vis the duties of the employer under labour law, since these are often closely connected with social security and imposed by a regulatory legal framework. Yet the position of the irregular immigrant under labour law is fundamentally different from that the position of the immigrant in public social security schemes. It is not without reason that, in international law, it is generally assumed that, contrary to social security benefits, employment based rights should be granted regardless of legal status. (Cholewinski 2005: 27-31). Particularly within the context of ILO instruments, this point seems to have gained general acceptance (Committee on Migrant Workers 2004: paragraph 27). The public/private divide offers a stronger argument for sphere separation than the differences between immigration law and social security. European instruments on employment rights, in particular those of the Council of Europe, are less clear-cut about this, but this does not mean to say that the legal position should be fundamentally different. Indeed, we support the recent conclusions of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in its report on irregular domestic workers, where it states the following: 

‘While access to the labour market can be restricted to nationals and/or lawfully abiding or residing foreigners, once a person is working, there are a set of human rights and basic labour rights which must be respected, even if the work relationship does not conform with the law. This includes, for example, rights with respect to fair working conditions, unjustified dismissal, or freedom of association and access to justice for violations of these rights’ (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011b: 11 and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011c: 57).

Some of these rights have actually been amplified by EU Directives. Article 6 of the Employers Sanctions Directive no. 2009/52/EC, for example, stresses the employer’s responsibility to pay any outstanding remuneration and requires Member States to provide mechanisms to ensure that irregular migrants may either submit a claim against their employer or may call on a competent authority in the Member State concerned to start proceedings to recover outstanding remuneration. 

Employment based rights also require effective remedies. Thus, irregular migrant workers must at least be free to join trade unions and take part in their activities. They should also at least be able to walk the streets and use public transport without having to fear apprehension, detention and deportation. Effective mechanisms should allow migrant workers to lodge complaints against abusive employers, again without having to run the risk of being subjected to restrictive measures of migration control. Given the role that trade unions, equality bodies and NGOs play in making justice mechanisms more accessible to irregular migrants, these should be facilitated in initiating legal proceedings on behalf of migrants. In other words, the effective protection of migrants’ fundamental rights implies facilitating and not undermining those social relations that provide alternative forms of social protection to those offered by national state regulated institutions.

Finally, a word about the line between private employers’ obligations and public social security schemes. Some social security schemes are rooted in mutual solidarity between workers; others are rooted in charity. A different rationale applies in relation to schemes for industrial accidents and occupational diseases. These schemes arose directly from the employer’s liability under civil law. With regard to insurance for industrial accidents and occupational diseases, the exclusion of irregular immigrants is less logical, and indeed often not applicable (Schoukens and Pieters 2004). There is, in other words, not only a social need (Cholewinsky 2005), but also a systematic reason for applying the labour law logic to these schemes and for not excluding immigrants on grounds of their status.

4.3.	Extra-territorial responsibility for emigrants

Social security systems have traditionally extended their coverage to national citizens living and working abroad. Thus, social assistance schemes sometimes apply to national citizens in other countries, if they do not get any assistance in their country of residence.​[21]​ Some social insurance schemes also allow for optional continued insurance for persons who move abroad. Such facilities gain extra importance when emigrants live and work in other countries in irregular conditions. This is the case, for example, for the Albanian social insurance system, which provides an opportunity for emigrants to remain affiliated to the system on a voluntary basis. In this way, a potential social protection facility is created for the hundreds of thousands Albanians working abroad in undeclared work and/or without authorisation of the immigration authorities (ISSA 2010).​[22]​

Sometimes extra-territorial responsibility manifests itself in more complex forms. An example of this is the Philippine government’s initiative to support workers overseas. Growing problems associated with working abroad have made migrant protection and representation an important priority for the Philippine government. One of the Philippine institutions providing migrant protection is OWWA, an institutionalised welfare fund that seeks to protect Filipino migrant workers abroad. OWWA is funded by a mandatory membership fee payable by the emigrants and by government grants. It offers support services for participation in pre-departure orientation seminars, public assistance programmes for people in need, on-site services at embassies and consulates, and an OWWA identification system (Ruiz 2008). Apparently inspired by the success of the Philippine fund, Sri Lanka has also come up with an initiative to help its workers who live abroad. The Sri Lanka Overseas Workers Welfare fund covers payments to migrants and their families in the event of death, disability or a need to cover travel expenses (ILO 2008).

These examples show how countries of origin can take increased responsibility for their migrants’ social protection in the absence of receiving country commitments (Van Ginneken 2008). In our view, this responsibility must be actively encouraged by international organisations as part of a strategy for providing alternative forms of social security protection for irregular migrants. 

The export of benefits − in particular long-term benefits − should also be encouraged by international organizations. It always has been a concern for the ILO, and recently the World Bank has also been developing an interest in it (Holzmann 2011). This is not mainly a responsibility of the emigrants’ countries of origin, but once again a responsibility of the receiving states. Exporting benefits is fully in line with the logics of immigration law, as this facilitates the return of the immigrants to their countries of origin. The reported process of retrenchment of the social security system runs contrary to this interest.

4.4.	International co-operation in the event of return

As observed, a plethora of services and facilities have come into being to financially support irregular migrants who return to their home countries. Such forms of support include the costs of transport, and sometimes also micro credits for setting up an occupational activity in the country of origin. The services are channelled through international organisations such as IOM, government agencies and NGOs. The sources of finance for such schemes are very diverse. The reasons for this financial support on return vary. It promotes voluntary return while also helping the individual concerned to start a new life in a new country, thus contributing to the social protection of irregular migrants (Beltman 2012). 

In our view, the financial return facilities should be actively encouraged, extended, and given standard recognition in the return packages that immigrant and emigrant countries negotiate with each other. In this way, the return of irregular immigrants will not only be a matter for readmission policies, but also part of development strategy and social policy. In the EU, in particular, these domains appear not to be connected. The EU concludes readmission agreements with third countries to make sure that these countries allow their nationals back into their territories without putting up bureaucratic or legal obstacles. These agreements constitute the framework for forced expulsions. Assistance for returnees is, however, an issue within the EU Regional Protection Programmes. These two forms of co-operation could be merged into one by creating standard return agreements which favour voluntary return and which not only tackle bureaucratic or legal obstacles for this return, but also the question of social protection and re-integration of irregular immigrants. Actually, a preference for voluntary return has actually also been expressed by the European Commission in the evaluation of the EU Readmission Agreements (COM (2011) 76 def.). Furthermore, it underlined this in the study by Sergio Carrera and Massimo Merlino on EU policies on undocumented immigrants, presented in 2009 by the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) (Carrera and Merlino 2009: 21-24).​[23]​





The purpose of this article was to develop alternative approaches to social protection for migrants who are excluded from the formal social security system, in particular irregular immigrants. In Section 2 we discussed the dynamics of exclusion from the formal social system. The overall picture is that access to social security is rendered more difficult for asylum seekers and for irregular immigrants, while the scope of application of the social security system is more closely linked to the national border (retrenchment to the national borders). These trends, which were attributed to restrictive immigration policies and the implicit rejection of transnational citizenship, have been allowed to take place without too much opposition from international law. Only in emergency cases or in relation to vulnerable groups do international human rights raise some barriers.

Section 3 dealt with the position of migrants in informal social security. Here it was discussed how, in addition to formal social security, social networks grounded in kinship or faith, a shared place of origin, or common locality of current residence, employment relationships and financial products can all play a role in securing basic needs. However, it was observed that these alternative forms of social protection are also under pressure as a result of restrictive immigration practices and the further criminalisation of irregular immigrants. An example of this is that irregular immigrants can no longer make use of the regular banking system.
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^1	  	This article is a highly abridged version of the first chapter of this book.
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^3	  	Many international co-ordination instruments on social security stipulate that minimum periods of residence may apply in residence based insurance schemes as a condition for full equal treatment, but when it comes to insurance conditions the same instruments periods prescribe that periods of residence completed in another contracting state must be treated as periods completed in the host state. Cf. for example, Art. 8(2) and Art. 28 of the European Convention on social security (1972).
^4	  	EC Regulation no. 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of social security systems. This Regulation is coupled with Regulation no. 987/2009, which includes administrative procedures necessary for applying the mother Regulation.
^5	  	c.f. Regulation no. 1231/2010.
^6	  	Until the Dutch Linkage Act (infra) brought this to an end in 1998.
^7	  	Presently art 7(2) Regulation 492/2011.
^8	  	Art. 4(4) Regulation no. 1408/71. The exclusion is maintained in present Regulation no. 883/2004 in Art. 3(5). 
^9	  	As a matter of fact, the provisions of Art. 7(2) Regulation no. 1612/68 still survives in the form of Art. 7(2) of Regulation no. 492/2011 on the freedom of movement for workers within the Union (codification).
^10	  	However, in the sphere of social assistance such a test was successfully introduced with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
^11	  	Art. 66 of the Agreement reads: ‘The provisions of this article shall not apply to nationals of the parties residing or working illegally in the territory of their host countries.’ See OJ EC 2000, L 70/16.
^12	  	Art. 34(2) of the Charter: ‘Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefit, and social advantages in accordance with Community law and practices.’
^13	  	czzssss.f. CRvB 4 May 2012, LJN BW5323.
^14	  	ECtHR 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09 MSS v. Belgium and Greece.
^15	  	House of Lords 3 November 2005, [2005] UKHL 66 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Limbuela c.s.
^16	  	ECSR 20 October 2009, complaint no. 47/2008 Defence for Children v. the Netherlands.
^17	  	Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 27 July 2010, LJN BN2164; Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 11 January 2011, LJN BO9924 upheld by the Supreme Court by its ruling of 21 September 2012 LJN BW5428.
^18	  	ECtHR 16 March 2010, Appl. No. 42184/85 Carson and others v. the United Kingdom.
^19	  	For this research, Sarah van Walsum collected data through semi-structured interviews with 15 Ghanaian and 17 Filipino domestic workers in Amsterdam. Subsequently she spent three weeks in Ghana and the Philippines respectively. During each of these periods she stayed with and/or interviewed family members of five informants from the Ghanaian and the Filipino segments of the Amsterdam sample respectively. This research was funded by the Dutch Research Council (NWO), as part of the collaborative ESF/EUROCORES project: Migration and Networks of Care in Europe.
^20	  	Research on the history of this national health insurance scheme has been done by Professor Irene Agyepong of Legon University, Accra, Ghana.
^21	  	This is the case in Germany (Art. 119 Bundessozialhilfegesetz), and was until recently the case in the Netherlands.
^22	  	Potential, because so far the voluntary scheme has not been over successful in attracting in participants. In 2009 the number had risen to 23,900 persons.
^23	  	The paper refers to research findings, inter alia, that forceful removal has negative implications for the reintegration of returnees, while a security approach to return makes southern Mediterranean countries unwilling to cooperate in this issue.
